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Abstract
Recently it was conjectured that an ElGamal-based public-key encryption scheme with stateful decryption
resists lunch-time chosen ciphertext and leakage attacks in the only computation leaks information model.
We give a non-trivial upper bound on the amount of leakage tolerated by this conjecture. More precisely,
we prove that the conjecture does not hold if more than a
(
3
8 + o (1)
)
fraction of the bits are leaked at every
decryption step, by showing a lunch-time attack that recovers the full secret key. The attack uses a new
variant of the Hidden Number Problem, that we call Hidden Shares - Hidden Number Problem, which is of
independent interest.
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1. Introduction
Leakage-resilient cryptography [1, 2] is a recent research line that aims at building countermeasures and/or
defences against side-channel attacks while providing security reductions in a provable security manner. The
methodology is as follows: an abstract model specifying the leakage data is chosen and the goal is to exhibit
a reduction from a hardness assumption to a hypothetical side-channel adversary. The theory of leakage-
resilient cryptography has witnessed a tremendous activity despite its short life. However, meeting the
strongest security levels (resiliency against continual leakage attacks [3]) under the weakest assumptions
(memory leakage [3]/auxiliary input [4]) is still out of reach from a practical point of view. To our knowledge
existing schemes are ineﬃcient when compared to their counterparts in the non-leakage setting; moreover,
current leakage-resilient constructions are conceptually far more complex than those a practitioner currently
ﬁnds in its cryptographic tool-box.
In this sense it is worth to mention the work by Kiltz and Pietrzak [5]. They propose BEG a pairing-
based analogue of the ElGamal encryption scheme [6] with stateful decryption which is leakage-resilient
against lunch-time chosen ciphertext and leakage attacks (CCLA1). The latter means that the classical
distinguishing adversary against ElGamal is given access to decryption and leakage oracles only before the
challenge ciphertext is given. The basic idea is to set the ElGamal secret key to be a group element (in
contrast to an integer), and then multiplicatively share it. While splitting the secret key before decryption
is a well-known technique, the novelty of this work is to propose to split a group element rather than an
integer. It is shown that if the secret key length is κ, then the BEG scheme is secure against leakage of at
most λ  κ2 bits at every decryption step. More precisely, λ < κ2 − ω (log κ) to make it infeasible to guess
the remaining bits of the secret key by a brute force attack. Their proof uses the so-called Generic Bilinear
Group Model [7].
The authors of [5] discuss the limitations of getting a security proof for a similar leakage-resilient property
of ElGamal with stateful decryption over arbitrary groups. Nevertheless they conjecture that, for certain
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arbitrary groups where the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman problem is hard, ElGamal with stateful decryption,
that they call EG?, might be resistant against side-channel attacks that abide by the Continual Leakage
Split-State model.
Our Contribution In this work we impose a limit on the conjecture from [5], by proving that if a minimum
of
(
3
8 + o (1)
)
κ bits are leaked at every invocation of the secret key, a CCLA1 attack exists against ElGamal
with stateful decryption scheme EG? that recovers the secret key. Interestingly, our limit to the conjecture
applies to any arbitrary instantiation of the underlying group. To achieve this result we deﬁne a new problem,
called Hidden Shares - Hidden Number Problem, which is a close but new variant of the Hidden Number
Problem [8].
Open Problem As far as we know, no (stateful) ElGamal-based public-key encryption scheme with constant
public-key size exists in the literature oﬀering (provable) resistance against continual leakage attacks (in the
standard model). Finding such a scheme remains a challenging open question.
1.1. Known Hidden Number Problems
The Hidden Number Problem (HNP) was originally introduced by Boneh and Venkatesan [8] to demon-
strate the hardness of computing the most signiﬁcant bits of the secret key in the Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange
mechanism. In its most generic form it can be described as follows. Let fα : D → V, α ∈ A be a family of
maps between algebraic domains D and V. The map is parametrized by α, that takes values from some set
A.
Deﬁnition 1. [Generic HNP [9]] Suppose some partial information about fα (t) ∈ V is given for several
values of t, chosen uniform randomly from a subset T ⊆ D, ﬁnd α.
Typically, D and V are ﬁnite ﬁelds Fp. An instance of the Generic HNP problem is the Modular Inversion
Hidden Number Problem (MIHNP) [10], also called Fp-Inverse-HNP [9]. In MIHNP, we have D = T =
Fp\ {−α}, V = A = Fp, where
fα (t) = MSBk,p
(
1
α+ t
)
,
where MSBk,p(z) means the (integer representing the) k most signiﬁcant bits of z (mod p), and the elements
of Fp are identiﬁed with integers of ﬁxed bit-length blog2 pc + 1. In other words, we are given n + 1 pairs
( ti,MSBk,p (1/(α+ ti)) ), for i = 0, . . . , n, where ti ∈ Fp\ {−α} are chosen uniform randomly and indepen-
dently, and the goal is to ﬁnd a polynomial-time (in log p) algorithm to recover α ∈ Fp completely. The
hardness of variants of this problem has been used to construct eﬃcient algebraic PRNGs and MACs [10]. A
close variant of MIHNP is one where
fα,β (t) = MSBk,p
(
β
α+ t
)
.
Another problem related to the HNP was addressed in [11] and it is called the HNP with hidden multi-
pliers (HM-HNP). In [9], the same problem is referred to as Fp-Approx-HNP.
Deﬁnition 2. [HM-HNP [11, 12, 13]] Given n pairs (MSBk,p (ti) ,MSBk,p (αti)), where α ∈ Fp and ti $← Fp,
ﬁnd α.
Deﬁnition 3. [HS-HNP] Given n pairs
(
MSBk,p (ti) ,MSBk,p
(
α
ti
))
, where α ∈ Fp and ti $← Fp\ {0}, ﬁnd
α.
To our knowledge the HS-HNP has not been explicitly addressed before. Note that unlike the Generic
HNP, in HS-HNP (also HM-HNP) only a partial information about the values ti is given. The name hidden
shares follows from the fact that ti and
α
ti
(mod p) are two multiplicative shares of α ∈ Fp.
We stress that in spite of similarities in the techniques used to solve various variants of HNP, there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the technical details. FoThese diﬀerences eventually reﬂect in the amount of partial
information (value of k) required to solve the problem with a reasonable success probability. For comparison,
the values of k required for HNP, MIHNP, and HM-HNP are
√
log p+log log p, 13 log p, and
4
5 log p, respectively
[8, 10, 11]. As we shall see in Section 3, HS-HNP requires the value of k to be at least 34 log p.
2
2. The Conjecture
We denote the ﬁeld of prime order p by Fp. The ﬁeld Fp is identiﬁed with Zp, and we use them in-
terchangeably. By MSBk,p(z), we mean the (integer representing the) k most signiﬁcant bits of z (mod p),
where the elements of Zp are represented by integers of ﬁxed bit-length m = blog pc + 1. For instance,
MSB2,7(3) = 1. The notation  log always refers to logarithm to the base 2. Finally, we denote by c, d
$← Zp
the sampling of values c and d uniform randomly and independently from the set Zp.
2.1. KEM and the leakage model
Formally, KEM consists of three algorithms KG, Enc and Dec. The key generation algorithm KG on input
a security parameter κ produces a pair of public and secret keys (pk, sk). The encapsulation algorithm Enc,
taking only pk as input, outputs an encryption C of a key K. The decapsulation algorithm Dec on inputs
sk and C outputs K. The goal of an adversary is to distinguish the encryption of a given key from that of
a random key. An adversary may be a Chosen Plaintext Attack- (CPA-) adversary if it has no access to a
decryption oracle. If it does have access to such an oracle then it is called a Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA)
adversary. CCA adversaries can be further classiﬁed into CCA1- or CCA2-adversaries. A CCA1-adversary
cannot query the decapsulation oracle after obtaining the challenge ciphertext.
In a KEM with stateful decapsulation, KEM = (KG,Enc,Dec1,Dec2), the decapsulation algorithm Dec
is split into two parts Dec1 and Dec2 executed consecutively. Each such algorithm uses diﬀerent parts
of the memory that therefore leak independent side-channel data, thus obeying to the Only Computation
Leaks/Split-State model [1, 14]. The secret key of KEM now consists of two parts ski = (σi, σ
′
i), each part
residing on a diﬀerent portion of the memory. Dec1 can access σi, while Dec2 has access only to σ
′
i. The
decapsulation procedures may update the secret key ski to ski+1 =
(
σi+1, σ
′
i+1
)
after each access to it. We
refer to one execution of the decapsulation query as a round.
The leakage in each round is modelled as the output of two adversarially chosen eﬃciently computable
functions fi(·) and gi(·) whose output length is bounded by λ bits each; λ is the leakage parameter. The
function fi(σi−1, ri) models the leakage produced when computing with σi−1 and the internal randomness ri
used by Dec1. The function gi(σ
′
i−1, wi, r
′
i) models the leakage wrt. σ
′
i−1, the internal randomness r
′
i used by
Dec2, and the information wi shared between Dec1 and Dec2. The KEM is said to be (κ, λ) secure under the
Chosen Ciphertext with Leakage Attacks 1 (CCLA1) if the scheme remains secure even when an adversary
can obtain λ bits of leakage from each of the two functions fi and gi, at every decapsulation query.
Stateful ElGamal KEM. Let the output of Gen(κ, λ) be a cyclic group G = 〈g〉 of prime order p, generated
by g. Let EG? = (KGEG? ,EncEG? ,Dec1EG? ,Dec2EG?) be the stateful KEM deﬁned in Section 3.1 in [15] as
follows:
1. KGEG?(κ, λ): Compute (G, g, p) ← Gen(κ, λ). Choose random x $← Zp and σ0 $← Z∗p. Set h = gx and
σ′0 = x · σ−10 (mod p). The public key is pk = (G, g, p, h), and the secret key is sk = (σ0, σ′0).
2. EncEG?(): Choose random l
$← Zp. The ciphertext is C = gl, and the key is K = hl.
3. Dec1EG?(σi−1, C): Choose random ri
$← Z∗p. Set σi ← σi−1 · ri (mod p), and K ′i = Cσi . Return (ri,K ′i).
4. Dec2EG?
(
σ′i−1, (ri,K
′
i)
)
: Set σ′i ← σ′i−1 · r−1i (mod p), and K = K ′σ
′
i
i . Return K as the shared secret
key.
Claim [5, Conjecture 1] EG? is CCLA1 secure if p− 1 has a large prime factor.
The above statement is incomplete if the leakage parameter λ (i.e., the amount of leakage from each of
Dec1EG? and Dec2EG?) is not speciﬁed. For instance, the conjecture could hold for λ log p2 . More precisely,
λ < log p2 −ω (log log p) to make it infeasible to guess the remaining bits by a brute force attack. Since leakage
is modelled by functions fi(σi−1, ri) and gi
(
σ′i−1, (ri,K
′
i)
)
, it is easy see that if λ > log p/2, then one can
completely recover ri in the i
th round and also some bits of the initial state (σ0, σ
′
0). In at most 2 dlog pe
rounds, the secret key x can be fully recovered. This is the trivial attack.
Relationship to the HS-HNP. In the following we argue that it is possible to obtain 2λ most signiﬁcant
bits of each of the two shares of the secret key in EG?. This is a consequence of the fact that λ bits of σi
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(respectively, σ′i) can be leaked from each of fi(σi−1, ri) and fi+1(σi, ri+1) (respectively, gi
(
σ′i−1, (ri,K
′
i)
)
and
gi+1
(
σi,
(
ri+1,K
′
i+1
))
), where i ≥ 1. After 2n + 2 rounds of execution of (Dec1EG? ,Dec2EG?), an adversary
will be able to obtain n+ 1 pairs
(
MSB2λ,p (σ2i+1) ,MSB2λ,p
(
σ′2i+1
))
of the secret key, where i = 0, . . . , n.
The above observation leads us to an instance of HS-HNP (Deﬁnition 3) with α = x, ti = σ2i+1 and
α
ti
≡ σ′2i+1 (mod p), where i = 0, . . . , n. Note that ti is uniform random and independent in Z∗p. Hence
investigating HS-HNP is a natural approach to resolve the above conjecture. This is the topic of the next
section.
Let us notice that in [15] it is wrongly stated that breaking the CCLA1 security of the stateful ElGamal
KEM is related to the Hidden Multipliers - HNP (Deﬁnition 2). That is, using our notation, the HM-HNP
boils down to an adversary that is getting leakage on ti and αti, which corresponds to ti = σ2i+1 and
αti ≡ σ′2i+1t2i (mod p), where i = 0, . . . , n. Apparently, the value αti is never computed in the ElGamal KEM
nor can possibly be computed by leakage functions.
3. Hidden Shares - Hidden Number Problem
Let p be an m-bit integer. We have m = blog pc + 1. Let yi = 2m−k · MSBk,p (ti) and bi = 2m−k ·
MSBk,p
(
α
ti
)
in Deﬁnition 3. Let ti = yi + δi,
α
ti
(mod p) = bi + i, where 0 ≤ δi, i < 2m−k, where
i = 0, . . . , n. Note that the integers yi and bi are known, while the integers δi and i are unknown. We have
(yi + δi) (bi + i) ≡ α (mod p). (1)
Since α is an unbounded variable, we will eliminate it from the n+1 equations represented by (1). We obtain
(yi + δi) (bi + i)− (y0 + δ0) (b0 + 0) ≡ 0 (mod p).
On rearranging the terms, we obtain a set of n equations (for i = 1, . . . , n) as
(−1) δ00 + (1) δii + (−b0) δ0 + (bi) δi + (−y0) 0 + (yi) i
+ (yibi − y0b0) ≡ 0 (mod p). (2)
For the sake of clarity, let us denote the coeﬃcients in the above
(
ith
)
relation by Ai, Bi, Ci, Di, Ei, Fi, Gi,
respectively in the order. Equation (2) can now be rewritten as
Aiδ00 +Biδii + Ciδ0 +Diδi + Ei0 + Fii +Gi ≡ 0 (mod p). (3)
Note again that the only unknowns in the above equation are δ0, δi, 0 and i. Equation (3) can be rewritten
over the integers as
Aiδ00 +Biδii + Ciδ0 +Diδi + Ei0 + Fii +Gi + p · µi = 0, (4)
where the µi are unknowns, and i = 1, . . . , n. The quantities µi are of little interest compared to that of
δi and i. We shall now construct a lattice that captures the relations deﬁned by (4). Since (4) contains
non-linear terms like δ00 and δii, we linearize the relation by treating the non-linear terms as a separate
variable. It is also desirable to have the solution we are looking for correspond to a short vector in the
lattice. Our construction is similar to the one in [10, Section 3.1].
3.1. Setting up the lattice
The lattice we construct has dimension 4n + 4 and it is represented by a (4n + 4) × (4n + 4) matrix M
consisting of rational entries. The lattice is generated as the row span of the matrix M . The structure of M
is as follows:
M =
(
J R
0 P
)
, (5)
where J and P are diagonal matrices having dimensions (3n+ 4)× (3n+ 4) and n× n, respectively. Matrix
R has dimensions (3n+4)×n. The rows ofM correspond to the terms present in the n relations represented
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Figure 1: The matrix M for the case n = 2. Let φ = 2k−m.
M =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 G1 G2
0 φ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C1 C2
0 0 φ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 D1 0
0 0 0 φ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 D2
0 0 0 0 φ 0 0 0 0 0 E1 E2
0 0 0 0 0 φ 0 0 0 0 F1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 φ 0 0 0 0 F2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 φ2 0 0 A1 A2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 φ2 0 B1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 φ2 0 B2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p

by (4). The ﬁrst row is associated with the constant term, the next n + 1 rows correspond to the variables
δi, next n + 1 rows with i, while the further n + 1 rows correspond to δii. The last n rows are associated
with the terms µi. Each of the last n columns of M correspond to a relation in (4), while the ﬁrst 3n + 4
columns are associated with the inverse of an upper bound on the size of the quantities 1, δi, i and δii (in
the solution we are interested in). In what follows, we give a complete description of the matrix M .
Let P [i′, j′] denote the entry in the i′th row and the j′th column of the matrix P . The matrix P has p
on all of its main diagonal, i.e. P [i, i] = p for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The ith row of P corresponds to the term µi in (4).
The diagonal matrix J has J [1, 1] = 1 (for the constant term), J [i′, i′] = 2k−m for 2 ≤ i′ ≤ 2n+ 3 (for terms
δi and i), and J [i
′, i′] = 22(k−m) for 2n+ 4 ≤ i′ ≤ 3n+ 4 (for terms δii). As we shall later see, these entries
of J are required to bound the norm of the vector corresponding to our solution. Each of the n relations of
(4) is described in matrix R (excluding terms p · µi, which are described by matrix P ). The entry R [i′, j′] is
the coeﬃcient of the term corresponding to row i′ in the j′th relation. Hence the columns of matrices R and
P together completely describe the system of equations (4).
As an illustration, the matrix M is described for the case n = 2 in Figure 1, where φ = 2k−m. The terms
corresponding to the 12 rows of M are (from top to bottom) 1, δ0, δ1, δ2, 0, 1, 2, δ00, δ11, δ22, µ1, and
µ2, respectively.
Let i = ei, δi = di (0 ≤ i ≤ n) and µi = ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be a solution to the system of equations (4),
where 0 ≤ ei, di < 2m−k. Note that such a solution exists from the way the system was constructed. Let v
be a (row) vector, of length 4n + 4, deﬁned as v = 〈1, d0, . . . , dn, e0, . . . , en, d0e0, . . . , dnen, u1, . . . , un〉.
Since ei, di and ui satisfy the system (4), it is easy to see that
v ·M =
〈
1,
d0
2m−k
, . . . ,
dn
2m−k
,
e0
2m−k
, . . . ,
en
2m−k
,
d0e0
22(m−k)
, . . . ,
dnen
22(m−k)
, 0, . . . , 0
〉
. (6)
Note that the vector v ·M has a leading 1, and n trailing zeros. Its length is 4n+ 4 and its Euclidean norm
‖v ·M‖2 satisﬁes
‖v ·M‖ 2 <
√
3n+ 4. (7)
If we are able to ﬁnd the vector v ·M , then we can readily recover the values di, ei, and hence solve the
system of (4). Since the vector v ·M has a bounded length, we can try to choose a value for k such that
the resulting lattice has a suﬃciently large determinant, and hence is unlikely to have many vectors shorter
than ‖v ·M‖ 2. Then we can run a lattice reduction algorithm, say LLL [16], to obtain reduced basis vectors.
We then hope that by exploiting the structure of the vector v ·M , we can obtain it as a simple combination
of a few short basis vectors. Since it appears hard to rigorously bound the probability of failure, we had to
content ourselves with the heuristic arguments, as it is common with these techniques.
We now give an estimate for the suitable values of k. The Gaussian heuristic gives an estimate of the
expected number of lattice points in a sphere of given volume. Consider a full rank lattice L′ in Rn′whose
determinant is det(L′). Let Vn′ (r′) denote the volume of an n′-ball Sn′(r′) of radius r′, centered at the origin.
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Lemma 4. [Gaussian Heuristic [17, pp. 28]] The expected number of lattice points of L′ in Sn′ is
Vn′(r′)
det(L′) .
An explicit formula for Vn′ (r
′) is
Vn′ (r
′) =
pi
n′
2
Γ(n
′
2 + 1)
r′n
′
, (8)
where Γ (·) is the Gamma function. In our case, the determinant of the lattice M in (5), det(M), is
det(M) =
pn
2(m−k)(4n+4)
≥ 2
(m−1)n
2(m−k)(4n+4)
. (9)
The above inequality follows from the fact that p is an m-bit integer. Note that the value of det(M) increases
with the value of k. By (7), ‖v ·M‖ 2 <
√
3n+ 4. We would like to choose such a value for k so that the
expected number of lattice points of M in S4n+4(
√
3n+ 4) is at most one. By Lemma 4 and (9), it suﬃces if
2(m−1)n
2(m−k)(4n+4)
≥ V4n+4(
√
3n+ 4).
On rearranging the above inequality, we get
k
m
≥ 3 +
4
n
4 + 4n
+
(
n+ log2
(
V4n+4(
√
3n+ 4)
)
m (4n+ 4)
)
. (10)
From (8), V4n+4(
√
3n+ 4) = pi
2n+2
(2n+2)! (3n+ 4)
2n+2. Therefore, in (10),
n+ log2
(
V4n+4(
√
3n+ 4)
)
m (4n+ 4)
= O
(
log n
m
)
.
If 1 n m, we obtain k = ( 34 + o (1))m.
Finally we can conclude that there is an eﬃcient (heuristic) method to solve the HS-HNP problem with
k =
(
3
4 + o (1)
)
m.
Remark 5. On applying the above method to attack the scheme EG? (c.f. Section 2.1), we obtain that the
stateful KEM EG? is not CCLA1 secure if the leakage parameter λ ≥ ( 38 + o (1)) log p. We would like to
note that our attack does not exploit any information about the elements of the underlying group G in EG?.
Hence this attack will work for any instantiation of the group.
3.2. Implementation details
We have implemented the above method to solve HS-HNP in the PARI/GP computer algebra sys-
tem [18]. The experiments were run on an Intel(R) Core i7-2600 CPU with 4 GB RAM, running cygwin
(ix86/GMP-4.2.1 kernel) 32-bit version. The results are given in Table 1. For every (n,m) pair, 10 random
m-bit primes p were chosen. For each p, 10 random hidden numbers α were chosen. The running time
reported is averaged over 100 (p, α) pairs for each row of the table. For lattice reduction, we have used the
routine qflll in PARI/GP.
In the experiments, we have observed that there is one (reduced) basis vector of very low norm, of order
1
2m−k . This is because the rows of the matrix M (Equation (5)) corresponding to the terms δii (0 ≤ i ≤ n)
can add up to produce the vector
〈
0 , . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
2n+3
, 2k−m, . . . , 2k−m︸ ︷︷ ︸,
n+1
0 , . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
〉
.
We have also observed that there are many (reduced) basis vectors with norm of about
√
3n+ 4. In order
to overcome these issues, we randomize the relations from Equation (2) by multiplying each relation by a
random independent element of Z∗p. This will not alter the solution set and yet there will be very short vectors
of the order 1
2m−k . But the experiments suggest that there will be only one (reduced) basis vector (second
shortest) of norm about
√
3n+ 4, and we can get the required values of di and ei from the corresponding
entries of the basis vector. This heuristic has not failed even once for the 900 (p, α) pairs of Table 1, provided
k is chosen according to Equation (10).
Acknowledgements. The ﬁrst author has received funding from the European Research Council under the
European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC grant agreement n◦ 258865.
6
Table 1: HS-HNP: implementation results
n m (bits) k (bits) km dimension(M) time (sec)
2 256 216 0.844 12 0.031
2 512 429 0.838 12 0.087
2 1024 856 0.836 12 0.290
5 256 205 0.800 24 0.507
5 512 408 0.797 24 1.367
5 1024 813 0.794 24 4.468
10 256 200 0.781 44 4.144
10 512 398 0.777 44 10.911
10 1024 794 0.775 44 32.395
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